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HOSPITAL INVOLVEMENT IN HEALTH CARE
COALITIONS
DOUGLAS J. COLTON*
The cost of health care has become a national dilemma. Approxi-
mately ten per cent of our gross national product is now directed to the
health care sector, and the rate of increase of costs in that sector has
regularly outstripped even the high general rate of inflation in recent
years. A few moments of reflection may suggest some of the roots of
this problem.
The resources devoted to healing arts have to a substantial degree
increased in proportion to their ability to deliver results. When medi-
cal care consisted of cutting off injured or infected limbs, bleeding pa-
tients of evident but uncertain malady, and administering opiates to
alleviate the symptoms but not the causes of pain, presumably the pub-
lic as a whole did not clamor for the opportunity to see doctors or enter
hospitals. Whatever proportion of national wealth was being dedicated
to health care as of the middle of the nineteenth century, it was cer-
tainly much less than ten per cent.
Such developments as smallpox vaccinations, rabies vaccine, and the
Pasteur process for avoiding milk-carried infections brought both re-
spectability and results to the provision of health care. Herbal nos-
trums were not necessarily displaced in the pharmacy, but a more
scientific and methodical approach to treating illness began to emerge
by the mid to late 1800's. Perhaps more than anything else, wide-
spread acceptance of the notion of sepsis may have served to make hos-
pitals acceptable, because the development of antiseptic techniques and
products served to minimize the fear that one was more likely to die of
the cure in a hospital than from the problem that put one there in the
first place. The development of anesthesia in turn permitted the devel-
opment of surgery as a respectable health care tool rather than a hide-
ous last resort.
By the turn of the century, the medical profession in this country was
being accorded higher status, and it in turn organized and manipulated
the health care system to further enhance its new-found status and
power. That organization influenced the subsequent evolution of the
hospital structure to something close to its current form and elevation
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of the general idea of health care as both preventative and curative,
thus justifying devotion of more resources to the sector. Thereafter,
development of "wonder drugs" such as penicillin and the sulfa com-
pounds, recognition of the causes of disease and means to cure or even
prevent them, and development of surgical techniques created a
snowballing effect in which health care became the province of learned
professionals instead of charletons and barbers.
Beginning during the Depression. a number of forces converged to
provide an economic support system capable of delivering medical
services to the general public. In the. years immediately before World
War 1I, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans were developed in the Mid-
west, with sponsorship of unions, hospitals and physicians. as a means
of assuring that the providers of health care services would be paid for
what they were selling, but also, whether intentionally or not, as a
means of spreading the cost of health care out over the healthy as well
as the sick. At an early stage in the automotive industry and thereafter
in other Mid-western smokestack industries as well, health care plans-
whether viewed as "insurance" or as "service benefit plans" or under
some other names-proliferated and established the notion that an em-
ployee could and should be compensated for his services through pro-
vision of health care benefits as well as through cold cash. After the
war, this notion spread rapidly through industry, to the point that today
virtually all large-scale employers and even a large proportion of the
tiniest entrepreneurs view protection against health care costs as a nec-
essary part of any compensation system.
As our public awareness of the needs of the elderly, unemployed,
and otherwise deprived in our society expanded in the 1960's, govern-
ment at the federal and state level began providing health care services
on an organized basis that previously had been donated on an ad hoc
basis by religious orders, other not-for-profit institutions, and individu-
als. Access to health care was- politically and socially transformed from
a privilege to be purchased by those who could afford it into a right or,
in current jargon, an entitlement. In a number of recent labor negotia-
tions between unions and troubled industries such as steel and auto
making, workers have demonstrated a willingness to surrender wages
rather than health care benefits. This attitude prevailed because even
the healthiest workers live in fear of the extraordinary costs that can be
attendant on even relatively minor health care problems.
At the same time that health care evolved from a haphazard concern
to virtually an unstated constitutional right, health care technology de-
livered more and more of something that had appeared desirable. Ma-
jor breakthroughs, such as polio vaccine, vastly enhanced the welfare
of the entire society by reducing the incidence of disease at a relatively
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small cost. However, medical technology has also followed the availa-
bility of funds. We have developed procedures such as renal dialysis
that can keep alive those who previously would have had severely lim-
ited life spans. Heroic measures can now be used to keep the termi-
nally ill alive for a few more hours or days or months. Physicians,
nurses, and capital equipment are thrown into the fray with relatively
little thought about whether these resources should be devoted to the
particular problem or patient at hand. No one wishes to be responsible
for social triage, which is the battlefield doctor's responsibility for de-
ciding who has a chance to live and should be helped. and who has no
chance and should not. Until very recently, we have done little to allo-
cate resources in health care; we have simply decided that everything
that can be done for every patient should be done, and that -somehow"
the associated costs will be paid.
The piper must now be paid. The federal health care funding sys-
tems are threatened with bankruptcy, and most state systems are faced
with similar prospects. Insurers, who are in fact only conduits in the
health care financing chain, have been demanding astronomical in-
creases in premium costs that reflect their rising costs. Employers
whose products are not selling well in domestic or international mar-
kets are discovering, as have those in the automotive industry, that
health care premiums can constitute up to forty per cent of their labor
costs. A kind of social consensus has been reached that we simply can-
not afford all of the health care we want, without directing attention to
the questions of what health care should be provided, to whom, and at
what costs, to be borne by what payors.
The choice of many nations, simply to incorporate the health care
system into the bundle of goods and services provided by government
to all citizens, is not likely to occur in this country for a variety of polit-
ical and social reasons. Even where that choice has been made, as in
Great Britain, the problems of who is to get what health care and at
what price, are not solved but merely shifted to different shoulders,
since it is hard to refuse to use a new technology or procedure or drug
that may in fact help someone remain alive or healthy. Presently, it
appears to be our political choice to leave the health care system basi-
cally in private hands, but subject to ever more extensive regulation of
charges for the goods and services demanded.
The federal and state funding programs have chosen a relatively sim-
ple temporary expedient for holding down health care costs. They
limit eligibility for services, and inform providers, especially hospitals,
that they will pay only so much for health care services and no more.
The providers of those services are given the choice of accepting no
patients whose services are paid for by the government, and who com-
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prise a substantial portion of the population, or of accepting those pa-
tients even if government programs pay less than the costs of the
services. Acceptance of the publicly funded patients may require shift-
ing any losses incurred by keeping the wards full of private payors,
such as insurance companies or the employers whom they represent.
This latter choice is the prevalent one: virtually all hospitals participate
in the Federal Medicare and state Medicaid programs and, if they are
to be believed (the evidence supports them), they lose money on every
patient treated although not as much money as would be lost if all of
those patients were turned away from the hospital.
Nonetheless, the hospitals do believe that they lose money in treating
these patients and that they must recover those losses elsewhere in or-
der to keep their doors open. They thus create the phenomenon known
in the industry as "cost shifting," which is no more than segregating
purchasers according to their ability to pay. Those who have private
health coverage are deemed able to pay more and are charged more
than are patients whose coverage comes through a government-spon-
sored system. The effect of the cost-shift phenomenon is that the health
care treatment at the same facility may cost hundreds of dollars per day
more if rendered to a privately insured (or personally wealthy) patient
than to one whose care is governmentally financed.
Of course, hospitals have been the primary focus because of the cost
shift problem and of efforts to hold down health care costs. Perhaps
physicians are more politically powerful, perhaps it is administratively
more difficult to control physician health care costs, and perhaps there
are other reasons as well, but the primary reason for focusing upon
hospitals in order to save money in the health care system is that insti-
tutional health care providers including hospitals and nursing homes
account for considerably more than half of all money spent on health
care in this country, concentrated into an administratively manageable
number of units. It is believed that there is more .waste and inefficiency
to be eliminated from institutional providers than can feasibly be ac-
complished by affecting the prices and the behavior of physicians or
drug companies or medical equipment manufacturers. I do not care to
comment on the propriety of that attitude, and only observe that the
great bulk of hospitals in this country are not-for-profit institutions and
are not making much, if any, profit. Nonetheless, they are viewed as
the place to look if money is to be saved in our health care system.
All of this brings us to the notion of "health care coalitions," and the
antitrust significance of them. My bias is fairly evident: I represent
hospitals, and I view coalitions with suspicion, because coalitions are
by definition aggregations of purchasers who band together to hold
down health care costs in their communities.
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1983], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/5
HEALTH CARE
That certainly does not sound evil and in fact would appear to be an
admirable goal, since no one is in favor of escalation of health care
costs and all the problems that such inflation can bring.- However, if
one is the administrator or chairman of the board of a hospital, and has
just been told that a coalition of aU of the largest employers in town has
been formed to restrain health care costs, then it is fairly easy to figure
out whose revenues are going to be suppressed if the coalition succeeds.
The members of the coalition want to spend less for health care. If they
spend less, then those who sell health care services will receive less. If
the sellers' costs of providing services do not drop as rapidly as their
revenues, then a reduction of revenues will lead to losses. Stated more
simply, if you have an expensive mortgage to pay on your hospital, and
a coalition succeeds in cutting the use of your hospital in half or your
prices by half, then you may abstractly applaud the savings enjoyed by
society; but you are going to wonder how to pay your mortgage with
only half the money you had expected when you borrowed in the first
place.
The coalition movement is fairly new, and last year occasioned the
formation of an American Hospital Association special Antitrust Task
Force on which I served, to examine the antitrust risks created by hos-
pital involvement with coalitions. We started out by trying to define
coalitions, and came to a kind of lowest common denominator formu-
lation. Coalitions are groups comprised of purchasers of health care,
sometimes also including sellers of health care services, organized.
around their common desire to see that good health care services are
available, but more importantly to see that the costs of those services
are kept at a minimum.
Typically, the organizing force behind coalitions is employers or in-
surers. Insurers do not like to have to pass on higher premiums to their
insureds or the employers of their insureds, and may wish to enhance
their profits by holding down the costs of paying claims. Ultimately,
however, the pressure for the coalition movement comes from employ-
ers who provide health care benefits. One could argue that in back of
the employers are the employees who have some awareness that a dol-
lar spent for health insurance premiums is a dollar that cannot be taken
out in wages. So far, however, it is the equivalent of the vice president
for personnel or the "benefits manager" of a corporation, rather than a
union representative or a group of employees, who is likely to suggest
the desirability of getting together with his or her peers to see what can
be done about health care costs.
Once the meeting is called, and a chairman has been elected, how is
a coalition to go about having an impact on health care costs? It is my
premise that the effectiveness of a coalition in restraining health care
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costs will in most circumstances be in direct proportion to the willing-
ness of the participants of the coalition to engage in antitrust violations.
There are so far no cases that I am aware of involving health care coali-
tions, which are a very recent phenomenon, and I do not even know of
any pending litigation about them. It may be that politics will make it
unlikely for hospitals ever to sue coalitions or their members. None-
theless, it appears reasonably likely that the effective coalitions will be
those that are willing to flex their economic muscle as purchasers to
compel the economic results that they want. I suggest that doing so
raises grave antitrust problems that apparently few if any coalitions
wish to think about.
Obviously, one way of holding down the overall cost of health care
would be simply to buy less of it. To that end, either persuading citi-
zens not to run to the doctor or hospital with every minor problem. or
persuading the physicians who admit patients to hospitals not to do so
quite so freely, will reduce the overall consumption level. Similarly,
promotion of "wellness" programs that help keep people healthy in the
first place would reduce the need for them to consume health care serv-
ices later. If we lump both of these concepts together under the label of
"educational activities," as an antitrust attorney I have little problem
with them and cannot imagine an antitrust challenge to them suc-
ceeding. In mnany respects, in fact, educational efforts are likely to be
the exercise of First Amendment rights, advising the public of conse-
quences of their action and suggesting means by which the general
public welfare may be improved. Let us then assume that newspaper
ads regarding the desirability of cutting down health care utilization,
and sponsorship of public health and wellness programs, are going to
be unobjectionable. In the greater scheme of things, I also tend to be-
lieve that they are not likely to be economically significant.
In the end, if employer groups are to be successful in holding down
health care costs, they have two primary means of seeking to do so:
they can attempt to create a system that will result in lower consump-
tion of health care services, or they can attempt to force the sellers of
health care services to do so at lower prices. Each of these possibilities
raises substantial, and interesting, antitrust problems.
As a starting point in antitrust analysis, some attempt should be
made to characterize the economic relationships of the coalition mem-
bers. Setting aside the hospitals, who will themselves presumably be
viewed as competitors of each other, the initial reaction may be that.
coalition members are not "competitors" because in a single commu-
nity they may well not be in the same line of business. On that assump-
tion, an aggregation of their economic power would not appear to be
what is called a horizontal relationship under antitrust law, meaning
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one between competitors, that may run a substantial risk of violating
the law. This analysis is incorrect because it looks to the goods or serv-
ices sold by these employers, rather than the goods or services
purchased by them. They may make automobiles, steel, computers. or
fried chicken, and not compete for the same customers in those sales,
but they are competitors with regard to the purchase of various things.
Hypothetically, if all of the automobile manufacturers in the United
States banded together and said that they would pay only so many dol-
lars per ton for steel, and enforced that agreement against sellers of
steel, there is little doubt that this would constitute an instance ofpur-
chaser price fixing. This phenomenon has rarely been noted in anti-
trust law, since most price fixing conspiracies that are the subject of
reported cases look to restraint of competition in sales and for a variety
of reasons purchaser conspiracies are probably much more difficult to
assemble or maintain.
Nonetheless. economic theory dictates, and the holding of A-anderille
Island Farms' at least suggests, that purchasers are as much con-
strained from fixing prices as are sellers. In that case, the purchasers
were sugar manufacturers, who agreed on the terms for buying sugar
beets from farmers. The issue confronting the Supreme Court in that
old case was whether the transactions involved had a sufficient connec-
tion with interstate commerce for there to be federal jurisdiction, but
the Court endorsed, virtually without discussion, the idea that a con-
spiracy between purchasers to fix the price they would be willing to pay
for a certain product would be an illegal restraint of trade.
A health care coalition that consists of employers in the same com-
munity poses the same issue. Those employers compete with each
other for the purchase of labor generally and for the purchase of health
care services through their health benefit systems. Even if payment for
those services is accomplished through a conduit such as an insurance
company, there can be little doubt that each of the employers has a
motivation to hold down the price of local health care services, since
ultimately those costs will be passed on to the employer in the form of
insurance premiums or even in the form of direct billing from the sell-
ers of health care services.
A typical, and perhaps not unrealistic, scenario might be a relatively
small city having four or five major employers who decide to form a
coalition to look into the costs of providing health care services at local
hospitals. Imagine that there are five hospitals in town, and that their
charges for a day of hospital services vary between $300 and $500, with
an average of $400. Coalition members, attempting to be fair, might
I. Mandeville Island Farms. Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.. 334 U.S. 219. reh denied.
334 U.S. 835 (1948).
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merely announce that they all agree that $400 a day is a reasonable
price, and that they will not pay the hospital bills for their employees in
excess of that amount. We will here assume that the employee benefit
or insurance plans can be adjusted to accomplish this goal, probably by
shifting any charge amounts over the announced maximum that the
employers are willing to pay onto the employees themselves. The em-
ployees therefore will have an enormous incentive to use only those
institutions that are willing to accept the specified price.
In this scenario, hospitals that can survive at $400 a day per patient
will presumably do all right, but those that must recover more money
per patient. for whatever reasons, will be in trouble. If they do not
adjust their prices, they will lose the patients whose health care cover-
age comes from the major employers in town. If those employers pro-
vide the health care benefits for a substantial proportion of the
population, the hospitals may have little choice but to conform to the
announced standard set by the coalition. The virtually inevitable con-
sequence of this action will be a stabilizing of prices in the community.
Remember that those hospitals that can afford to charge less than $400
a day will know that they are safe charging up to that amount, and
their prices may float upward. Other hospitals, in order not to lose
patients. may have to push their rates downwards and hope to recover
costs somewhere else. In the jargon of antitrust prosecutions. the con-
duct of the coalition will have "tended to fix or stabilize" local hospital
price levels.
For those of you who view price fixing that pushes prices down as
somehow less contrary to the spirit of antitrust law than upward price
fixing. let me assure you that the Supreme Court has announced in
clear terms that price fixing is illegal regardless of whether it is "up-
ward" or "downward." '2 The hospitals in this scenario are victims of a
price fixing conspiracy. and one that I think the antitrust laws would
easily find illegal.
An alternate scenario is one in which the employers participating in
the coalition do not announce a specific price at which they are willing
to purchase health care services, but rather perform a study of local
health care costs and determine which hospitals are the high cost. and
which providers are the "efficient" or "'low cost," providers. In this
instance, instead of announcing an amount that they are willing to pay,
the employers may announce to whom they are willing to pay health
care benefits, meaning that their employees who go to high price hospi-
tals will not receive reimbursement, or perhaps will receive reimburse-
ment only at some reduced level. This arrangement could again be
2 See U S v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.. 310 U S. 150 (1940). Arizona v Maricopa County
Medical Soc). M0- S. Ct 2466 11982).
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characterized as price fixing, since it will tend to force prices to the level
of the so-called efficient producers, and it will also constitute a group
boycott, another major sin under antitrust law, to the extent that the
collective purchasing power of the employers is being directed away
from certain disfavored sellers in order to coerce them into changing
their economic conduct. However socially desirable the goals of these
employers, this is conduct that is not permissible under antitrust law.
and would probably compel boycotted hospitals that were losing pa-
tients and going out of business to bring suit. and quite likely to win.
I want to emphasize that antitrust law does not prohibit hard bar-
gaining and does not restrict the right of any particular purchaser to
attempt to get the best price possible for whatever it may be buying.
One major employer in town may be able to deal directly or indirectly
with hospitals. and set the level of its employee health benefits, either to
limit payments to $400 per day, or to steer employees to a particular
hospital or group of hospitals, without a major risk of running atbul of
antitrust law. It is only when two or more of the employers in the same
community seek to accomplish the same ends collectively, instead of
independently, that substantial dangers are created under antitrust law.
In its most basic form, antitrust law assumes that competition be-
tween numerous buyers and numerous sellers will eventually force the
market price of goods and services to reach an appropriate level and
that any aggregation of buyers or sellers using their power to effect that
equilibrium price creates a distortion that should not be permitted at
law. This is economic theory, not necessarily reality, but it is also the
thrust of a large body of case law that attempts to push parties into
unilateral economic decisions. That case law has developed out of
commercial transactions that are very different from the typical
purchase and sale of health care services, and at least respectable argu-
ments can be made that the theory does not fit too well in the health
care context, so that different kinds of behavior should be permitted
here than.elsewhere in the economy. However meritorious those argu-
ments may be, they have substantially been suppressed by the Supreme
Court in Maricopa. and whether they like it or not the purchasers who
are banding together in health care coalitions must behave with as
much circumspection regarding health care providers as they do at
their own industry trade association meetings-where they are told
again and again by their attorneys that they must not discuss the prices
at which they are willing to sell their own-goods and services.
In dealing with health care coalitions, the antitrust issues are in fact a
lot more difficult than in the hypotheticals just discussed. It is iinlikely
that employers will display a naked exercise of economic power such as
that described, but they may do other things that end them up in the
9
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same place. Interesting dilemmas are raised: What if the coalition em-
ployer members do a survey of local hospitals, determine which are the
most efficient and low-cost, and then take out newspaper ads strongly
'urging" employees to use only the less expensive facilities? Is this a
simple First Amendment exercise? Arguably, it is, even though the ef-
fect of such publicity may be as harmful to the less efficient, high-cost
hospitals as an agreed-upon boycott. At some point between mere an-
nouncement of what employers believe to be good social policy, and
agreement by them as to whom they will pay for services, there is a vast
grey area of conduct into which I suspect many health care coalitions
are going to stumble.
It is not only the employers who will face these dilemmas. Hospitals
will be under substantial pressure to cooperate with coalitions because
failure to do so will suggest a lack of concern for the underlying di-
lemma of high health care costs. However. once a hospital has begun
to participate in or with a health care coalition, it may itself become a
violator of antitrust law as much because of the conduct of others as
because of its own conduct. For example, the low-cost hospitals in the
examples will presumably be the beneficiaries of any revisions in the
local health care system that come about as a consequence of coalition
activity. If employers succeed in steering their employees away from
expensive facilities to more efficient facilities, the efficient facilities will
increase their volume, their revenues, and presumably their profits. If
those efficient facilities have not only agreed to open their doors to the
increased patient flow, but also have provided data to the coalition, or
even more have conferred and bargained with the employer members
of the coalition, then those hospitals may have become co-conspirators
with the employers in the "boycott" of the high-cost hospitals.
The hospital community may find that it becomes fragmented and
turns upon itself, hospitals not only competing with each other but su-
ing each other for conspiring to fix prices or eliminate competition.
Those of us who deal regularly with hospitals may at first find the no-
tion of one hospital invoking antitrust law against another to be far
fetched, but if the alternative is bankruptcy and the end of the institu-
tion. even the most passive board of trustees of a not-for-profit institu-
tion may seek recourse in court.
Thus, to a certain extent a hospital can find itself at risk merely by
cooperating with a coalition and, for instance, providing it with infor-
mation that the hospital knows is going to be used by employer mem-
bers to obtain bargaining leverage. Some interesting, and not easily
solvable, issues are raised that may depend upon the state of mind and
the state of knowledge of a hospital that provides information to a coa-
lition knowing that it is likely to be the beneficiary of anticompetitive
10
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conduct committed by others. Under traditional antitrust analysis. lia-
bility can attach in this situation, but courts may choose to exercise
leniency if they find no motive to suppress competition on the part of
hospitals themselves. Still, this may be a question of evidence, to be
decided by a jury, which is certainly an unpredictable and even more
certainly expensive way for hospitals to learn what they may or may
not do.
My comments so far have been addressed to steps that coalitions
may take directly to affect the cost of services purchased from hospitals.
However, as noted previously, the other mechanism through which co-
alitions may seek to hold down costs may be in reducing consumption
of the services themselves.' This very idea has interesting implications
in antitrust law, since an underlying premise of the whole body of anti-
trust law and economics is that increased production and consumption
of whatever good or service is being discussed is a social good. Indeed.
the first tenet of antitrust law is that antitrust law helps preserve compe-
tition, which in turn helps assure the greatest variety and quantity of
goods and services at the lowest cost for the greatest number of con-
sumers. Antitrust law favors consumption and thus increases in pro-
ductive capacity. since it assumes that the greater the capacity to
produce the lower the cost per unit is likely to be. Health care econom-
ics has in recent years taken a different turn, using such things as cer-
tificate of need laws to try to reduce capacity and otherwise to try to
diminish rather than increase both supply of and demand for health
care services. This contradiction between antitrust and health care
goals has scarcely been addressed, much less resolved, by courts han-
dling these cases.
Coalitions may attempt to reduce health care demand through a va-
riety of mechanisms. The most likely to be effective is to reduce the
amount of service that will be paid for by the employer, thus compel-
ling employees to decide how much health care they can afford to buy.
The trend until recently in health insurance has been towards "first
dollar" coverage, meaning that all services from the first doctor visit of
the year through the most drastic of surgery should be covered. This
provides patients and their physicians no incentive to cut back on con-
sumption and to decide to forego treatment for relatively minor
problems. Coalitions can become the focal point for individual em-
ployer efforts to reduce consumption by agreeing that employees
should not have first-dollar coverage, or should have to share with the
insurance plan ten percent or twenty percent of every health care dollar
spent.
A collective redefinition in a given community of the "going rate" for
health care benefits is not very different from an agreement among em-
11
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ployers as to how much they will pay in wages. Employers who collec-
tively agree as to the appropriate scope of health care coverage are
fixing the terms of health care coverage in a way that may create anti-
trust injury, and standing, both to employees, who find that they no
longer can shop among employers to get better health care coverage
along with their jobs, and as well to hospitals or physicians who dis-
cover that their volume of business has been reduced since patients
cannot any longer afford as much of it. There is enough precedent to
suggest that both the employers and the health care providers would be
able to bring and maintain antitrust suits alleging that this kind of col-
lective activity constitutes a violation.
I do not mean here to attempt to describe the entire gamut of health
care coalition activity or the antitrust risks that might be attendant on
any particular form of conduct. What I do wish to emphasize is that
coalitions whose stated purpose is holding down health care costs can-
not simply be viewed as shepherds to lead us out of the wilderness of
our health care financing problems. The issues are terribly complex.
and most means of "holding down" costs will result in diminishing the
revenues that someone receives. When that -someone" is a not-for-
profit hospital that is attempting to provide its community a wide vari-
ety of services, some of which are money-losing but are still considered
necessary, then substantial questions are raised as to whether a simply
stated social goal such as "lower health care costs" should be accom-
plished through a mechanism such as a coalition. We have to remem-
ber that almost 100 years of antitrust law have evolved a stern
disapproval of similar uses of economic power--disapproval that re-
mains even when the stated purpose for the use of that power appears
admirable.
I do not recommend that hospitals, or employers, or insurers, throw
up their hands and decide that coalitions are too much of a risk to be
tried. What I do suggest is that we all should remember that it took a
long time and a lot of converging factors to create the health care
financing problems that we have today, and to heed the common wis-
dom: for every problem there is a simple, direct, and obvious solu-
tion-and that solution is usually wrong.
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